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Abstract 
Alexithymia is an important mental health construct, but there is continuing debate regarding 
its definition and measurement. We attempt to resolve this definitional uncertainty in two 
ways. Firstly, we trace the development of the alexithymia construct, focusing particularly on 
what we call the Toronto and Amsterdam models, and examine a body of empirical research 
that shows strong support for the hypothesis that alexithymia consists of three components 
(difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and externally orientated 
thinking). Based on these components, we formulate an alternate theoretical model of 
alexithymia, the attention-appraisal model of alexithymia, that aligns alexithymia theory with 
recent advances in the broader emotion regulation field. Secondly, we examine the 
construct’s latent structure by factor analysing data from multiple psychometric measures 
administered to a community sample (N = 368). Our results suggest statistical support for our 
model, rather than the Toronto or Amsterdam models. We end by discussing how our model 
accounts for several unresolved issues within the alexithymia field, including the construct’s 
relation to imaginal capacities and emotional reactivity, whether alexithymia is a deficit or a 
defence, how it might be addressed in psychiatric treatment, and the discordance that has 
existed between alexithymia theory and alexithymia measurement. 
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Establishing the Theoretical Components of Alexithymia via Factor Analysis: Introduction 
and Validation of the Attention-Appraisal Model of Alexithymia 
Psychoanalytic practitioners working with psychosomatic patients in the middle part 
of the 20th century observed that they often presented with a cluster of emotion7 processing 
deficits. These patients were unable to “describe their feelings or to differentiate among 
them” and displayed “an absence of the capacity to produce fantasies with the result that 
[their] thought content [was] restricted to a preoccupation with external objects, people, and 
environmental events” (Nemiah, 1984, p. 127). Sifneos and Nemiah first used the term 
alexithymia (from the Greek, a = lack, lexis = word, thymos = feeling) to describe this 
phenomenon (Nemiah & Sifneos, 1970; Sifneos, 1973). 
Modern authors still use the term alexithymia to describe this cluster of emotion 
processing deficits and it is widely considered to be a dimensional trait that is normally 
distributed in the general population (e.g., Parker, Keefer, Taylor, & Bagby 2008). 
Researchers have further confirmed that psychosomatic patients do typically present with 
elevated levels of alexithymia (Duddu, Isaac, & Chaturvedi, 2003) and it is also regarded as 
an important transdiagnostic risk factor for a range of psychopathologies, including, 
depression (Honkalampi, Hintikka, Laukkanen, & Viinamaki, 2001), anxiety disorders 
(Zeitlin & McNally, 1993), personality disorders (Berenbaum, 1996), eating disorders 
(Taylor et al., 1996), and substance use (Thorberg et al., 2009). The alexithymia construct is, 
thus, of substantial clinical interest. There is, however, continuing debate regarding its 
definition, measurement, and theoretical underpinnings (Lane et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2016; 
Watters, Taylor, & Bagby, 2016). 
7 Most authors (e.g., Gross, 2014; Lane & Schwartz, 1987) use the term emotion to refer to loosely coupled 
changes that arise across three channels of the emotion system: the subjective-experiential (e.g., feeling of fear), 
physiological (e.g., increased heart rate), and behavioural (e.g., urge to run) channels. This is the meaning we 
intend when using the term emotion throughout this paper. 
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In this paper, we attempt to resolve some of this definitional uncertainty in two ways. 
Firstly, we trace the development of the alexithymia construct, focusing particularly on what 
we will refer to as the Toronto and Amsterdam models, and examine a body of empirical 
research that shows strong support for the hypothesis that alexithymia consists of three 
components. Based on these components, we use Gross’s (2015a) extended process model of 
emotion regulation to formulate an alternate theoretical model of alexithymia that we refer to 
as the attention-appraisal model of alexithymia. Secondly, we conduct a study whereby we 
factor analyse multiple psychometric measures in order to examine the latent structure of the 
alexithymia construct, and in so doing, test some important predictions of our model. 
Developmental history and empirical research  
The dominant contemporary work in developing the alexithymia construct has been 
done by two groups of researchers who we will refer to as the Toronto and Amsterdam 
groups. These two groups have proposed different definitions of alexithymia, and almost all 
contemporary researchers select between these definitions when describing the construct. 
Below, we outline each of these models and detail the results of empirical work that has 
tested their specifications. 
Toronto model. The Toronto group (Taylor et al., 1999) developed a model of 
alexithymia building on the work of pioneers in the area (Marty & M’Uzan, 1963; Nemiah, 
1977; Nemiah & Sifneos, 1970; Sifneos, 1973) who used psychoanalytic concepts to explain 
their observations. Marty and de M’Uzan (1963), for example, proposed that alexithymia was 
due to disturbance in the early child-mother relationship that disrupted childhood 
development of the ability to experience feelings or use fantasy as a means to satisfy 
instinctual drives. Proponents of this psychoanalytical approach, therefore, believed that 
people with high levels of alexithymia were prone to experiencing somatic symptoms 
because they were unable to use fantasy and psychic elaboration to regulate the energy of 
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their instinctual drives (see also, McDougall, 1974; Nemiah, 1977). 
The Toronto group built on this psychoanalytic theorising by also applying cognitive 
theories of emotion processing (e.g., Bucci’s [1997] multiple code theory, and Lane and 
Schwartz’s [1987] cognitive-developmental theory of levels of emotional awareness) to the 
understanding of alexithymia, whilst still retaining the multidimensional structure of the 
construct originally described by Nemiah and Sifneos (1970). The Toronto model, therefore, 
specifies that alexithymia is comprised of four interrelated (positively correlated) 
components: difficulty identifying feelings in the self (DIF); difficulty describing feelings 
(DDF); an externally orientated thinking (EOT) style whereby one tends to focus excessively 
on the details of the external world rather than focusing attention on their internal states; and 
constricted imaginal processes (difficulty fantasising; DFAN), marked by the absence or 
scarcity of daydreams and fantasies. The Toronto model further specifies that the DIF and 
DDF components are closely linked to form a broader affect awareness component, and the 
EOT and DFAN components form a broader operative thinking component (see Figure 5.1) 
(Bagby et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 1999). This model is presently the most widely used 
definition of alexithymia within the literature (Watters, Taylor, Quilty, & Bagby, 2016). 
The Toronto group developed two measures of alexithymia based on their model, the 
20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994) and the Toronto Structured
Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA; Bagby et al., 2006). The TSIA is an observer-rated 
measure with items designed to measure DIF, DDF, EOT and DFAN, and the TAS-20 is a 
self-report questionnaire with items designed to measure DIF, DDF and EOT. The earliest 
version of TAS-20, known as the TAS (Taylor et al., 1985), also included DFAN items, 
however the Toronto group removed the DFAN items in later revisions (Taylor Bagby, & 
Parker, 1992). 
Empirical support. Subsequent empirical work using these measures has allowed for 
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the latent structure of the alexithymia construct to be tested. This work has supported much of 
the Toronto model. Examinations of the TAS-20’s psychometric structure consistently find 
that scores on the DIF, DDF and EOT subscales correlate significantly and positively, and 
load on the same higher-order factor in factor analysis (e.g., Bagby et al., 1994; Gignac et al., 
2007; Meganck et al., 2008). Similarly, to our knowledge, in all studies the DIF, DDF and 
EOT subscales of the TISA correlate positively (Bagby et al., 2006; Caretti et al., 2011; 
Grabe et al., 2009; Inslegers et al., 2013), suggesting that these components could be part of 
the same latent construct. The Toronto model’s specification that DFAN is part of the same 
construct as DIF, DDF and EOT has, however, garnered less psychometric support. 
To the best of our knowledge, all psychometric studies using the original TAS have 
found that the DFAN subscale is uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the DIF and DDF 
subscales (e.g., Taylor et al., 1985; Haviland, Hendryx, Cummings, Shaw, & MacMurray 
1991); the Toronto group cite these results as a reason the DFAN subscale was removed from 
revisions of the measure (Taylor et al., 1992). Conversely, all studies using the TSIA have 
found that its DFAN subscale does correlate coherently (positively) with its DIF, DDF and 
EOT subscales (Bagby et al., 2006; Caretti et al., 2011; Grabe et al., 2009; Inslegers et al., 
2013), however, cross-correlations with other alexithymia measures suggest that this may 
primarily be due to shared method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Namely, of the five 
samples where correlations between the TSIA and TAS-20 have been examined (Bagby et 
al., 2006; Caretti et al., 2011; Grabe et al., 2009; Inslegers et al., 2013), in most (three) 
samples, the TSIA DFAN subscale did not correlate significantly with the TAS-20 total scale 
score (Bagby et al., 2006; Caretti et al., 2011), and in Caretti et al. (2011) the TSIA DFAN 
subscale was negatively correlated with the TAS-20 DIF subscale. Similarly, we know of one 
study (Rosenberg et al., 2016) that has compared the TSIA to the Bermond-Vorst 
Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ; Vorst & Bermond, 2001), and in this case, the TSIA 
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DFAN subscale correlated strongly with the BVAQ DFAN subscale, but did not correlate 
with the BVAQ DIF, DDF or EOT subscales. Indeed, in the one study to conduct a network 
analysis of the TSIA, Watters, Taylor and Bagby (2016) found that the DFAN items did not 
fit well within the same network as the DIF, DDF and EOT items. Most experimental studies 
have documented similar findings. In most experimental work, people with high or low levels 
of alexithymia (grouped based on TAS-20 total scale scores) are found to not differ with 
respect to imaginal efficiency (Czernecka & Szymura, 2008) or the vividness of visual 
imagery (Bausch et al., 2011; Golena, 2014; Mantani, Okamoto, Shirao, Okada, & 
Yamawaki, 2005; but see Campos, Chiva, & Moreau, 2000; Friedlander, Lumley, Farchione, 
& Doyal, 1997). This collection of empirical findings has, consequently, led some authors to 
recently question the extent to which DFAN is a feature of alexithymia (e.g., Bausch et al., 
2011; Morera, Culhane,Watson, & Skewes, 2005; Watters, Taylor, & Bagby, 2016; Watters, 
Taylor, Quilty, & Bagby, 2016). 
Amsterdam model. The Amsterdam group (Vorst & Bermond, 2001) propose an 
alternate definition of alexithymia. The Amsterdam group built on the four components of 
alexithymia delineated by the Toronto group (DIF, DDF, EOT, DFAN) and added a fifth 
component, reduced emotional reactivity (or difficulty emotionalising; DEMO). Vorst and 
Bermond (2001, p. 417) define emotional reactivity as “the degree to which someone is 
emotionally aroused by emotion inducing events”, which is a narrower definition than is 
typically used within the emotional reactivity field (see Becerra & Campitelli, 2013), but 
raises the possibility that alexithymic people do not experience emotions (i.e., along the 
subjective-experiential channel of the emotion system) as intensely as other people. The 
Amsterdam group justify the inclusion of these five components within their definition of 
alexithymia based on their interpretation that they were described by Nemiah and Sifneos 
(1970). The Amsterdam group, further, organise these five components according to a 
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different higher-order structure, whereby they are subsumed within two broader components 
that are orthogonal to each other; cognitive alexithymia, composed of DIF, DDF and EOT, 
and affective alexithymia, composed of DFAN and DEMO (see Figure 5.1). Vorst and 
Bermond (2001) specify that there are subtypes of alexithymia; type I alexithymia, where 
people have difficulties in both cognitive alexithymia and affective alexithymia, and type II 
alexithymia, where people have difficulties only in cognitive alexithymia. 
The Amsterdam group developed a self-report measure of alexithymia based on their 
model, the aforementioned BVAQ (Vorst & Bermond, 2001), which includes items designed 
to assess DIF, DDF, EOT, DFAN and DEMO. Bermond et al. (1999) originally specified that 
these five components should be positively correlated, thus, the separation of these 
components into an orthogonal structure seems, in our interpretation of their work, to be 
psychometrically driven. 
Empirical support. Psychometric studies of the BVAQ have found that it conforms to 
this orthogonal structure in factor analyses. The DIF, DDF and EOT subscales load together 
onto a higher-order factor (cognitive alexithymia), and the DFAN and DEMO subscales load 
on a separate higher-order factor (affective alexithymia); these higher-order factors are 
largely uncorrelated (e.g., Bermond et al., 2007; Vorst & Bermond, 2001; Zech, Luminet, 
Rimé, & Wagner, 1999). Factor analytic work with the BVAQ has therefore been consistent 
with the Amsterdam model, and the body of TAS-20 work described earlier can also be seen 
as supportive of the cognitive alexithymia construct. Other empirical work has, however, 
been inconsistent with some specifications of the Amsterdam model. 
We are aware of only one cluster analysis study that has examined whether the type I 
and type II alexithymia subtypes exist statistically, and in this case (using BVAQ data), no 
such subtypes were found (Bagby et al., 2009). Moreover, with respect to the inclusion of 
DEMO within the Amsterdam model, most empirical work not using the BVAQ DEMO 
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subscale to operationalise emotional reactivity has found that cognitive alexithymia is not 
orthogonal to emotional reactivity. Namely, most experimental studies have found that 
individuals with high DIF, DDF and EOT report feeling significantly higher levels of 
negative affect in response to stressful stimuli or laboratory tasks (e.g., Eastabrook et al., 
2013; Connelly & Denney, 2007; Newton & Contrada, 1994; Pollatos et al., 2011; but see 
Luminet, Rimé, Bagby, & Taylor, 2004), and elevated levels of cognitive alexithymia are 
commonly present in clinical groups whose symptoms are characterised by hyper-reactivity 
within the emotion system (e.g., borderline personality disorder; New et al., 2012). Studies 
using psychometric measures of psychological distress or personality, similarly, find that 
cognitive alexithymia is associated with significantly higher levels of self-reported negative 
affect (e.g., Baily & Henry, 2007; Leising, Grande, & Faber, 2009; Li, Zhang, Guo, & Zhang, 
2015; Lundh & Simonsson-Sarnecki, 2001; Morera et al., 2005) and neuroticism (a 
personality trait characterised by emotional instability and proneness to negative affect; e.g., 
Muller et al., 2004; Morera et al., 2005). 
We think these inconsistencies between the BVAQ literature and other literature with 
respect to DEMO might be accounted for by the manner in which the BVAQ operationalises 
DEMO. Earlier, we noted that Vorst and Bermond’s (2001) definition of emotional reactivity 
is narrower than that typically used in the emotional reactivity field. In that field, the 
construct is usually defined as the ease of activation, intensity and duration of one’s 
emotional responses, and a distinction is further made between negative reactivity (reactivity 
with negative emotions) and positive reactivity (reactivity with positive emotions) (Becerra et 
al., 2017; Becerra & Campitelli, 2013; Davidson, 1998). Emotional reactivity researchers 
consider the distinction between negative reactivity and positive reactivity to be of particular 
import, as statistically they are separate dimensions that are negatively correlated with each 
other (Becerra et al., 2017). Vorst and Bermond (2001), however, do not make a distinction 
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between positive and negative reactivity in their definition, and this is reflected their BVAQ 
DEMO subscale; four items refer to negative emotions, one refers to positive emotions, and 
three do not specify a valence. In our view, not specifying valence in a DEMO item may be 
problematic as the respondent must guess what type of emotion was meant, and the 
combining of negative and positive valence items into a single score is not theoretically 
supported due to the negative correlation between these reactivity dimensions (see Becerra et 
al., 2017). In our view, three of the BVAQ DEMO items also appear to measure empathy 
rather than emotional reactivity. These three items are specific to whether an emotion is 
elicited by compassion or care for others (e.g., item 9 “When I see somebody crying 
uncontrollably, I remain unmoved”), and are therefore inseparable from the personal distress 
facet of empathy delineated by Davis (1983) in his popular model of empathy. Empathy, as a 
construct, is negatively correlated with alexithymia (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & 
Berthoz., 2010), and most authors consider empathy and emotional reactivity to be separable 
constructs (Becerra & Campitelli, 2013; Davidson, 1998). The BVAQ DEMO items have, 
indeed, been found to be inconsistent in the direction of their correlations with other 
constructs (Watters, Taylor, Quilty, & Bagby, 2016) and the subscale has displayed low 
internal consistency in some samples (e.g., Muller et al., 2004). We, consequently, place 
more weight in the findings of those studies that did not use the BVAQ DEMO subscale to 
operationalise emotional reactivity, and most of these findings indicate that cognitive 
alexithymia is not orthogonal to emotional reactivity. 
Summary of empirical findings. The weight of the empirical literature, therefore, 
appears to support most (but not all) specifications of the Toronto and Amsterdam models. 
Both models agree that DIF, DDF and EOT are interrelated components of a common latent 
construct, and on this point there is strong empirical support. The weight of the empirical 
literature, however, suggests that some parts of these models may be misspecified, in that 
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DFAN and DEMO do not, statistically, appear to be part of this same 
construct. The attention-appraisal model of alexithymia 
The empirical findings summarised above suggest that the alexithymia construct 
might be better defined as consisting of only DIF, DDF and EOT. To provide an empirically 
credible framework for future research and explain why only these three components 
statistically cohere, we hence propose a new theoretical model of alexithymia; the attention-
appraisal model of alexithymia. In formulating this model, we also use this opportunity to 
incorporate recent advances in the broader emotion regulation field (Gross, 2015a) into 
alexithymia theory, because we believe these advances might provide a useful theoretical 
framework for conceptualising alexithymia. We specifically use Gross’s (2015a) recently 
introduced extended process model of emotion regulation as a framework for our model of 
alexithymia, because many authors consider it to be at the forefront of emotion regulation 
theory and it has been successfully applied to a multitude of emotional phenomena (e.g., 
Aldao & Christensen, 2015; Diaz & Eisenberg, 2015; Giuliani & Berkman, 2015; Kuppens & 
Verduyn, 2015; Schmader & Mendes, 2015). Within this framework, we also seek to 
integrate Lane and Schwartz’s (1987) cognitive-developmental theory of levels of emotional 
awareness. Lane and Schwartz’s theory has been discussed and accepted previously by the 
Toronto group (Taylor et al., 1999), but we think integrating it within Gross’s (2015a) model 
will provide some more clarity. 
The core tenet of Gross’s (2015a) extended process model of emotion regulation is 
that people generate, process, and regulate emotions via valuation systems. All valuation 
systems are comprised of a four stage situation-attention-appraisal-response8 sequence, 
8 In Gross’s (2015a) extended process model of emotion regulation, these stages are actually labelled the world-
perception-valuation-action stages, respectively. We, instead, use the original labels for these stages (i.e., the 
labels used in the earlier modal model of emotion [Gross, 1998] and process model of emotion regulation 
[Gross, 1998]) because we consider these alternate labels to be more intuitively descriptive for the purpose of 
conceptualising alexithymia. 
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whereby a stimulus is valuated (evaluated) in terms of its meaning for the individual. 
Emotions are considered to be generated via a valuation system where: an emotion inducing 
stimulus is present (situation stage; e.g., a snake is in the room), the individual focuses their 
attention on the stimulus (attention stage; e.g., looking at the snake), they appraise the 
stimulus in terms of what it is and what it means for their goals (appraisal stage; e.g., this 
snake in the room is bad for the goal of staying alive), and an emotional response results 
(response stage; e.g., fear). This emotional response can itself then become the focus of 
valuation, whereby it is valuated in terms of whether it is a desired state. Specifically, to 
valuate an emotional response (situation stage) the individual must focus attention on the 
emotion (attention stage), appraise the emotion in terms of what it is and what it means for 
their goals (appraisal stage), and they then might activate a goal to engage in action that 
reduces the discrepancy between the current state of the world and their desired state of the 
world (response stage; e.g., the feeling of fear is not a desired state so the individual runs 
away from the snake in an attempt to reduce the feeling). The response stage of this latter 
valuation system represents emotion regulation within Gross’s (2015b, p. 130) model, 
defined as “the activation of a goal to modify an unfolding emotional response”. 
In the attention-appraisal model of alexithymia, we propose that it is within this same 
valuation system that alexithymia manifests. We posit that EOT can be conceptualised as 
difficulty at the attention stage of this valuation system. That is, an emotional response has 
occurred, but the individual has difficulty focusing their attention on it. Similarly, DIF and 
DDF can be conceptualised as difficulties at the appraisal stage of this valuation system. 
That is, an emotional response has occurred, but the individual has difficulty accurately 
appraising what the emotional response is and what it means. There is a subtle shift in 
emphasis here when describing EOT relative to early descriptions from psychoanalytic 
commentators (e.g., Nemiah, 1984); the pertinent point is not that the alexithymic individual 
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focuses excessively on external objects or events, but rather, from the reverse perspective, 
that they do not properly focus their attention on their emotions. Consequently, whilst we 
agree with the close clustering of DIF and DDF within the Toronto model, we propose 
difficulty appraising as a label for this grouping rather than affect awareness, because we 
think EOT also represents an affect awareness problem (one at the attention stage of emotion 
valuation). Alexithymia is, therefore, conceptualised as a closely clustered set of difficulties 
during the emotion valuation process described by Gross (2015a). 
The degree of difficulty people experience at the attention and appraisal stages of 
emotion valuation, we believe, can be understood in terms of the levels of emotional 
awareness specified by Lane and Schwartz (1987). Based on Piaget’s (1981) theory of 
cognitive development, Lane and Schwartz delineate five developmental levels (or stages); 
ranging from level one and two, where the individual can experience emotions only as global 
bodily sensations or diffuse unpleasant/pleasant states, to levels three, four and five, where 
the perception of discrete and specific emotions becomes possible and gradually more 
nuanced. Lane and Schwartz posit that people’s level of emotional awareness depends on the 
degree of development in their emotion schemas, which Lane and Schwartz define as those 
cognitive structures that guide the processing of emotions. Based on interpersonal 
interactions, people’s emotion schemas are thought to develop and become hierarchically 
organised, more complex, integrated, and differentiated. Experimental researchers have, 
indeed, since found evidence suggestive of impaired emotion schema functioning in people 
with high levels of alexithymia (e.g., Lane et al., 1996; Luminet, Vermeulen, Demaret, 
Taylor, & Bagby, 2006; Lundh, Johnsson, Sundqvist, & Olsson, 2002; Suslow & Junghanns, 
2002; Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille, 2006). 
We, therefore, follow Lane and Schwartz’s (1987) theorising when positing in our 
model that difficulties at the attention and appraisal stages of emotion valuation can occur 
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due to what we call ability deficit alexithymia, that is, people’s emotion schemas being 
underdeveloped (i.e., poorly organised, differentiated, and integrated). People’s schemas 
guide the manner in which they attend to the world (e.g., Markus, 1977) and if their emotion 
schemas are underdeveloped, they may be unable to focus on the most pertinent aspects of 
the emotional response during the attention stage of emotion valuation. People also use their 
schemas during the appraisal stage, and if these emotion schemas are underdeveloped they 
may be unable to accurately, or with sufficient degrees of differentiation, interpret patterns of 
input information about the emotion to enable valuation at a specific (e.g., “I am feeling 
embarrassed” or “I am feeling angry”), rather than a broad or diffuse (e.g., “I am feeling 
bad”), level (Lane & Schwartz, 1987). 
Ability deficit alexithymia by itself, however, fails to explain why some people’s 
overall levels of alexithymia often increase during periods of distress (e.g., Luminet, Bagby, 
& Taylor, 2001; Luminet, Rokbani, Ogez, & Jadoulle, 2007), or recent findings that the 
association between alexithymia and psychiatric symptoms is sometimes mediated by 
experiential avoidance (e.g., Bilotta, Giacomantonio, Leone, Mancini, & Coriale, 2015; 
Panayiotou et al., 2015). Recent findings, thus, suggest that some difficulties at the attention 
and appraisal stages of emotion valuation may also be caused by what we call avoidance 
alexithymia. We hypothesise that avoidance alexithymia represents an avoidant emotion 
regulation strategy (attentional deployment; see Gross, 2014) whereby at the attention stage, 
people may avoid properly focusing their attention on the emotional response, and at the 
appraisal stage, people may avoid linking available input information about the stimulus (i.e., 
the emotion) to their emotion schemas. As we illustrate in Figure 5.2, in our model, 
avoidance alexithymia is activated at the response (i.e., emotion regulation) stage of a 
valuation system that is valuating an emotion, but the result of this avoidance response then 
ultimately manifests at the attention and appraisal stages of subsequent valuation systems; 
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that is, the avoidance behaviour that is activated as an emotion regulation strategy causes the 
individual to regress to operating at a lower developmental level at the attention and appraisal 
stages of subsequent emotion processing. 
In sum, alexithymia is conceptualised as a set of difficulties during the attention 
(EOT) and appraisal (DIF, DDF) stages of emotion valuation. The overall extent of these 
difficulties is determined by the developmental level of people’s emotion schemas (i.e., 
ability deficit alexithymia) and the degree to which they are using experiential avoidance of 
emotions as a regulation strategy (i.e., avoidance alexithymia). 
Figure 5.1. A visual representation of the different theoretical models that attempt to describe the 
structure of the alexithymia construct; the Toronto model, the Amsterdam model, and the attention-
appraisal model. Double headed arrows indicate that the constructs are conceptualised as being 
positively correlated. DIF = difficulty identifying feelings, DDF = difficulty describing feelings, EOT 
= externally orientated thinking, DFAN = difficulty fantasising, DEMO = difficulty emotionalising 
(low emotional reactivity).  
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Figure 5.2. A visual representation of where, according to the attention-appraisal model of 
alexithymia, alexithymia manifests during the emotion valuation process. EOT = externally orientated 
thinking, DIF = difficulty identifying feelings, DDF = difficulty describing feelings. All valuation 
systems are comprised of four sequential stages; a situation (S), attention (At), appraisal (Ap) and 
response (R) stage (Gross, 1998, 2015a). Valuation system 1 represents an emotion being generated, 
whereby an emotion inducing stimulus is present (S1), attention is focused on the stimulus (At1), the 
stimulus is appraised in terms of what it is and what it means for the individual’s goals (Ap1), and an 
emotional response results (R1). In valuation system 2, this emotional response can itself become the 
stimulus that is the target of valuation (S2), whereby attention is focused on the emotion (At2), it is 
appraised in terms of what it is and whether it is a desired state (Ap2), and then a goal might be 
activated to modify the unfolding emotional response (R2, i.e., emotion regulation). Some degree of 
ability deficit alexithymia (whether that be a high or low amount of difficulties) is present in all 
valuation systems with an emotion at the S stage, and manifests as difficulties at the At (EOT) and Ap 
(DIF, DDF) stages. Such difficulties reflect the developmental level of one’s emotion schemas. 
Valuation system 3 represents subsequent emotion processing, after valuation system 2 has finished. 
In valuation system 3, the individual might have additional difficulties at the At3 and Ap3 stages 
attributable to avoidance alexithymia. These additional difficulties will occur if, in the R2 stage of 
valuation system 2, the individual activated a goal to modify the emotion (i.e., an emotion regulation 
strategy) by using experiential avoidance; that is, attempting to avoid focusing attention on (EOT) or 
appraising (DIF, DDF) the emotional response in subsequent emotion processing. 
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Statistical comparison of the available models 
The attention-appraisal model, Toronto model, and Amsterdam model all make 
testable and different predictions about the latent structure of the alexithymia construct. 
Whilst we consider the existing body of psychometric work to be consistent with the notion 
that alexithymia is comprised of three components, we also think that some further work is 
needed before a three component definition is accepted. Specifically, existing studies have 
factor analysed single measures in isolation, and as a result, whilst informative, their results 
are more vulnerable to being influenced by the intricacies of that specific test. In this study, 
we therefore seek to advance the literature base by administering multiple self-report 
measures of alexithymia and emotional reactivity, and using exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analyses to examine the latent structures common to all measures. Our research 
question being: is the latent structure of the alexithymia construct, when assessed via self-
report measures, consistent with the attention-appraisal model, Toronto model, or Amsterdam 
model? 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
Our data-set was comprised of 368 English speaking adults (209 females) from the 
general community. All participants were living in Australia at the time of the study, and 
their age ranged from 18 to 83 (M = 49.56, SD = 16.67). For 31.6% their highest level of 
completed education was high school, for 35.6% it was a technical diploma, and for 32.6% it 
was a university degree. Most of the sample (90.8%) were not currently studying at 
university. Participants were recruited via an online survey recruiting company (Qualtrics 
panels) or an advertisement placed on a social media website. Participants completed a 
battery of self-report questionnaires administered via an online anonymous survey. Some 
additional participants (recruited in the same manner) also completed the questionnaire 
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battery, but their data were excluded during screening because they failed at least one of three 
attention check questions and/or completed the survey impossibly quickly (suggesting 
inattentive responding). 
Materials 
Included in the questionnaire battery were four questionnaires designed to measure 
alexithymia or emotional reactivity. Internal reliability coefficients for all administered 
measures are displayed in Table 5.1. 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20. The TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994) is a 20 item self-
report measure of alexithymia. Items correspond to three subscales representing DIF (T-DIF 
subscale; 7 items, e.g., “I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling”), DDF (T-
DDF subscale; 5 items, e.g., “It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings”) 
and EOT (T-EOT subscale; 8 items, e.g., “Being in touch with emotions is essential” 
[reverse-scored]). These subscales are combined together into a TOTAL SCALE score 
representing overall levels of alexithymia. Because this total score only includes items 
assessing DIF, DDF and EOT, it is consistent with alexithymia as it is specified by the 
attention-appraisal model. Participants respond to each item on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly Agree), with higher scores indicating greater levels 
of alexithymia. Research has supported the validity and reliability of most scores derived 
from the TAS-20, though the T-EOT subscale typically has low internal reliability (Kooiman 
et al., 2002; Meganck et al., 2008). 
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire. The BVAQ (Vorst & Bermond, 2001) 
is a 40 item self-report measure of alexithymia. Items are designed to measure DIF (D-
IDENTIFYING subscale; 8 items, e.g., “When I am upset, I know whether I am afraid or sad 
or angry” [reverse-scored]), DDF (D-VERBALSING subscale; 8 items, e.g., “I find it 
difficult to express my feelings verbally”), EOT (D-ANALYSING subscale; 8 items, e.g., “I 
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hardly ever consider my feelings”), DFAN (D-FANTASISING subscale; 8 items, e.g., “I 
have few daydreams and fantasies”), and DEMO (D-EMOTIONALISING subscale; 8 items, 
e.g., “When friends around me argue violently, I become emotional” [reverse-scored]).
Standard scoring involves calculating subscale scores for these five facets. The D-
IDENTIFYING, D-VERBALISING and D-ANALYSING subscales are also combined 
together into a COGNITIVE ALEXITHYMIA score, and the D-FANTASISING and D-
EMOTIONALISING subscales are combined together into an AFFECTIVE 
ALEXITHYMIA score. The COGNITIVE ALEXITHYMIA score is consistent with 
alexithymia as it is specified by the attention-appraisal model. Participants respond to each 
item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (this in no way applies) to 5 (this definitely applies). 
Higher scores indicate greater levels of alexithymia (for the D-EMOTIONALISING 
subscale, higher scores indicate lower levels of emotional reactivity). The validity and 
reliability of most scores derived from the BVAQ have been supported (Vorst & Bermond, 
2001; Bermond et al., 2007), though as noted earlier, we have some concerns about the 
construct validity of the D-EMOTIONALISING subscale. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 36 item self-report measure of emotion regulation 
and alexithymia. Two of its subscales conceptually correspond to the DIF and EOT facets of 
alexithymia. The CLARITY subscale (5 items, e.g., “I have no idea how I’m feeling”) is a 
measure of DIF, and the AWARENESS subscale (6 items, e.g., “I pay attention to how I 
feel” [reverse-scored]) is a measure of EOT. The DERS also includes four other subscales 
that measure aspects of emotion regulation. Participants respond to each item on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always), with higher scores indicating 
greater difficulties. For this study, we combined the CLARITY and AWARENESS subscales 
together to form an ALEXITHYMIA COMPOSITE score. This ALEXITHYMIA 
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COMPOSITE score is consistent with alexithymia as it is specified by the attention-appraisal 
model, though incomplete in that it does not include the DDF aspect of appraisal. The DERS 
subscales have demonstrated good validity and reliability (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). 
Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale. The PERS (Becerra et al., 2017) is a 30 item self-
report measure of emotional reactivity. It measures the typical ease of activation, intensity, 
and duration of one’s emotional responses, and does so for negative and positive emotions 
separately. Six subscales can be derived from the PERS, each with 5 items: POSITIVE-
ACTIVATION (e.g., “I tend to get happy very easily”), POSITIVE-INTENSITY (e.g., 
“When I am joyful, I tend to feel it very deeply”), POSITIVE-DURATION (e.g., “When I’m 
feeling positive, I can stay like that for a good part of the day”), NEGATIVE-ACTIVATION 
(e.g., “I tend to get upset very easily”), NEGATIVE-INTENSITY (e.g., “If I’m upset, I feel it 
more intensely than everyone else”), and NEGATIVE-DURATION (e.g., “Once in a 
negative mood, it’s hard to snap out of it”). The three subscales within each valence domain 
can also be combined together into a GENERAL POSITIVE REACTIVITY scale score or 
GENERAL NEGATIVE REACTIVITY scale score, representing overall levels of reactivity 
for that valence. Items are answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very unlike 
me) to 5 (very like me), with higher scores indicating higher levels of reactivity. The PERS 
has demonstrated good validity and reliability (Becerra et al., 2017). 
Analytic strategy 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted using AMOS 24, all other 
analyses were conducted using SPSS 24. 
Pearson correlations and exploratory factor analysis. Pearson correlations between 
all administered scales/subscales were calculated; to control for type 1 error given the large 
number of correlations, a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of < .001 was used as the criteria 
for statistical significance. Subscale scores from the measures were used to perform an 
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exploratory factor analysis (EFA; principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation). 
Confirmatory factor analyses. Subscale scores were also used in series of CFAs 
(maximum likelihood estimation based on a Pearson covariance matrix) to examine the 
goodness-of-fit of statistical models reflecting either the attention-appraisal model, Toronto 
model, or Amsterdam model. Goodness-of-fit was judged based on the pattern of factor 
loadings and intercorrelations within each model (Marsh et al., 2004), and three fit indices: 
the comparative fit index (CFI), the normed fit index (NFI), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). These three fit indices were chosen as they are considered to be 
among the best indicators of model fit (Byrne, 2013). CFI and NFI values around > .90 were 
judged to indicate acceptable fit, as were RMSEA values around < .08 and less than .10 
(Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Browne & Cudeck, 1992; Marsh et al., 2004). Models were also 
directly compared using the Akaike information criterion (AIC); lower AIC values indicate a 
better fitting model (Byrne, 2013). Factor loadings > .40 were considered meaningful 
loadings; this cut-off was selected because it has been endorsed by various authors (e.g., 
Matsunaga, 2010; Stevens, 1992) and is the most commonly used cut-off within 
psychometric literature (e.g., Bagby et al., 2006; Kooiman et al., 2002). When discussing the 
observed variables and latent factors within our CFA models, for sake of clarity, observed 
variables or indicators are written in capital letters and not surrounded by apostrophes (e.g., 
D-ANALYSING) and latent factors are surrounded by apostrophes (e.g., ‘EOT’).
All CFA models included five first-order factors: ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’, ‘EOT’, ‘DFAN’, and 
‘negative reactivity’. Each latent factor had three observed variables or indicators (subscales). 
As we administered only two subscales measuring ‘DDF’ and one subscale measuring 
‘DFAN’, following the recommendations of Gorsuch (1983), to ensure that we had at least 
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three indicators for these factors we divided some subscales into parcels9. For ‘DDF’, we 
created two parcels of items from the BVAQ D-VERBALISING subscale; D-
VERBALISING parcel 1 was composed of the first four items of this subscale, and parcel 2 
was composed of the last four items. For ‘DFAN’, we created three parcels of items from the 
BVAQ D-FANTASISING subscale; D-FANTASISING parcel 1 was composed of the first 
three items from this subscale, parcel 2 from the middle three items, and parcel 3 from the 
last two items. 
The five first-order factors in each model were composed of the following subscales 
as their indicators: ‘DIF’ (T-DIF, D-IDENTIFYING, and CLARITY), ‘DDF’ (T-DDF, D-
VERBALISING parcel 1, and parcel 2), ‘EOT’ (T-EOT, D-ANALYSING, and 
AWARENESS), ‘DFAN’ (D-FANTASISING parcel 1, parcel 2, and parcel 3), ‘negative 
reactivity’ (NEGATIVE-ACTIVATION, NEGATIVE-INTENSITY, and NEGATIVE-
DURATION)10. All indicators were reasonably normally distributed (maximum skewness = 
.84, maximum kurtosis = -.82). The tested models differed in their higher-order factor 
structure so as to reflect either the attention-appraisal model, the Toronto model, or the 
Amsterdam model (see Figure 5.3). 
Model 1 was based on the attention-appraisal model. In Model 1, the ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’ 
and ‘EOT’ factors were specified to load on a higher-order ‘alexithymia’ factor, whilst the 
9 The BVAQ D-VERBALISING subscale was selected for item parcelling because it had the most items of the 
DDF subscales, and the first and last 20 items of the BVAQ are often administered separately as parallel short 
versions (Zech et al., 1999). The items of those subscales selected for parcelling have demonstrated 
unidimensionality in various samples (e.g., Vorst & Bermond, 2001). In our sample, a single factor solution 
accounted for 50.96% of the variance in D-VERBALISING item scores, and 43.36% of the variance in D-
FANTASISING item scores.   
10 Although Vorst and Bermond (2001) discuss DEMO as being a unidimensional construct in their theoretical 
model, more recent work has shown negative reactivity and positive reactivity to be separable dimensions 
(Becerra et al., 2017). For this reason, only negative reactivity was included within our CFA models. We chose 
to include negative reactivity rather than positive reactivity, because most of the BVAQ D-EMOTIONALISING 
items refer to negative emotions, hence we considered negative reactivity to be closer to how Vorst and 
Bermond (2001) conceptualised DEMO within their model. The BVAQ D-EMOTIONALISING subscale was 
not included as an indicator of negative reactivity in any of our CFA models, because of our theoretical concerns 
about this subscale’s construct validity and its statistical performance in our EFA.   
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‘DFAN’ and ‘negative reactivity’ factors were allowed to correlate with this higher-order 
factor and with each other. Model 2a and Model 2b were based on the Toronto model. In 
Model 2a, the ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’, ‘EOT’ and ‘DFAN’ factors were specified to load on a higher-
order ‘alexithymia’ factor, and the ‘negative reactivity’ factor was allowed to correlate with 
this higher-order factor. In Model 2b, the ‘DIF’ and ‘DDF’ factors were specified to load on a 
higher-order ‘affect awareness’ factor and the ‘EOT’ and ‘DFAN’ factors were specified to 
load on a higher-order ‘operative thinking’ factor, these higher-order factors were allowed to 
correlate with each other and the ‘negative reactivity’ factor. Model 3 was based on the 
Amsterdam model. In Model 3, the ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’ and ‘EOT’ factors were specified to load on 
a higher-order ‘cognitive alexithymia’ factor, and the ‘DFAN’ and ‘negative reactivity’ 
factors were specified to load on a higher-order ‘affective alexithymia’ factor, these higher-
order factors were allowed to correlate. As a comparative baseline, we also tested the fit of a 
five-factor correlated model with no higher-order structure imposed (Model 4). 
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Figure 5.3. A visual representation of the tested CFA models, designed to represent either the 
attention-appraisal model (Model 1), Toronto model (Model 2a and Model 2b), Amsterdam model 
(Model 3), or a correlated model used as a comparative baseline (Model 4). Squares indicate observed 
variables/indicators, ellipses indicate latent variables. Each observed variable had an error term (not 
displayed). DIF = difficulty identifying feelings, DDF = difficulty describing feelings, EOT = 
externally orientated thinking, DFAN = difficulty fantasising, neg react = negative reactivity, alexi = 
alexithymia, affect aware = affect awareness, opera think = operative thinking, cog alexi = cognitive 
alexithymia, aff alexi = affective alexithymia. Latent variables were comprised of the following 
subscales (from the TAS-20, BVAQ, DERS, and PERS) as their observed variables: ‘DIF’ = T-DIF, 
D-IDENTIFYING, CLARITY; ‘DDF’ = T-DDF, D-VERBALISING parcel 1, and parcel 2; ‘EOT’ =
T-EOT, D-ANALYSING, AWARENESS; ‘DFAN’ = D-FANTASISING parcel 1, parcel 2, and




Pearson correlations and exploratory factor analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 5.1. All DIF, DDF and 
EOT subscales were significantly positively correlated (rs = .30 to .63). The BVAQ D-
FANTASISING subscale, however, was uncorrelated or weakly negatively correlated with 
the DIF subscales (rs = -.18 to -.02), uncorrelated with the DDF subscales (rs = -.13 to -.03), 
and uncorrelated or weakly positively correlated with the EOT subscales (rs = .09 to .21). 
The BVAQ D-FANTASISING subscale was also uncorrelated with all cognitive alexithymia 
total scale scores (TAS-20 TOTAL SCALE, DERS ALEXITHYMIA COMPOSITE, BVAQ 
COGNITIVE ALEXITHYMIA; rs = -.06 to .08). When emotional reactivity was measured 
via the PERS, all cognitive alexithymia total scale scores were significantly associated with 
higher levels of negative reactivity (rs = .27 to .43) and lower levels of positive reactivity (rs 
= -.29 to -.35). Conversely, the BVAQ D-EMOTIONALISING subscale was uncorrelated 
with most cognitive alexithymia total scale scores (rs = .00 to .23). A Table containing all 
Pearson correlations is provided in Appendix C. 
Our EFA resulted in a four factor solution (eigenvalues > 1), accounting for 71.97% 
of the variance (see Table 5.2). Factor 1, which we name ‘difficulty appraising feelings’, was 
comprised of all the DIF and DDF subscales. Factor 2, which we name ‘negative reactivity’, 
was comprised of all the PERS negative reactivity subscales. Factor 3, which we name 
‘positive reactivity’, was comprised of all the PERS positive reactivity subscales. Factor 4, 
which we name ‘difficulty attending to feelings’, was comprised of all the EOT subscales. 
The BVAQ D-FANTASISING and D-EMOTIONALISING subscales did not load 
substantially on any of the extracted factors. These two subscales loaded mostly on the 
‘difficulty attending to feelings’ factor, but the size of their loading (< .40) was not large 
enough for it to be considered that this factor accounted for a meaningful amount of variance 
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in these subscale scores (Stevens, 1992). Of import, the BVAQ D-EMOTIONALISING 
subscale did not load substantially on either of the PERS emotional reactivity factors, 
suggesting that the BVAQ D-EMOTIONALISING subscale was not measuring the same 
construct as the PERS. Thus, in our EFA, DFAN and DEMO were not part of the same latent 
structure as DIF, DDF or EOT, nor was DFAN part of the same latent structure as negative or 
positive reactivity. 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha (α) Internal Reliability 
Coefficients for the Administered Measures 
Scale/subscale M SD α 
TAS-20 
  Total scale 48.12 12.29 .87 
T-DIF 14.98 6.11 .87 
T-DDF 13.00 4.80 .83 
T-EOT 20.14 4.47 .59 
BVAQ 
  Cognitive alexithymia 61.18 14.20 .88 
  Affective alexithymia 42.46 9.00 .76 
D-Identifying 18.66 5.19 .75 
D-Verbalising 23.57 7.12 .86 
D-Analysing 18.94 5.39 .77 
D-Fantasising 21.17 6.34 .79 
D-Emotionalising 21.29 5.31 .71 
DERS 
  Alexithymia composite 25.77 7.59 .86 
  Awareness 15.71 5.34 .84 
  Clarity 10.07 3.69 .82 
PERS 
  General positive reactivity 51.98 8.93 .92 
  Positive-activation 17.41 3.65 .77 
  Positive-intensity 15.65 3.03 .84 
  Positive-duration 18.92 3.64 .83 
  General negative reactivity 43.98 13.23 .94 
  Negative-activation 14.37 4.81 .86 
  Negative-intensity 15.47 4.58 .86 
  Negative-duration 14.13 4.93 .88 
Note. TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20, BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst 
Alexithymia Questionnaire, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale, PERS = Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale. 
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Table 5.2 
Factor loadings from an exploratory factor analysis of the subscales of the TAS-20, 

















D-Identifying .616 .171 -.034 .148 
D-Verbalising .686 -.113 -.109 .114 
D-Analysing .209 .166 .032 .866 
D-Fantasising -.199 -.103 -.033 .362 
D-Emotionalising -.076 -.232 -.305 .372 
TAS-20 
T-DIF .640 .270 .030 -.071 
T-DDF .930 -.139 -.031 -.044 
T-EOT .336 .083 .060 .572 
DERS 
   Clarity .749 .130 -.016 .009 
   Awareness .417 -.013 -.078 .522 
PERS 
   Positive-activation  -.059 -.141 .882 .073 
   Positive-intensity .011 .136 .721 -.005 
   Positive-duration -.118 -.352 .720 -.003 
   Negative-activation .007 .874 -.029 .080 
   Negative-intensity -.060 .895 -.025 -.075 
   Negative-duration .033 .872 -.070 .020 
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are in boldface. Intercorrelations between the extracted factors 
were as follows; F1 and F2 = .46; F1 and F3 = -.20; F1 and F4 = .27; F2 and F3 = -.05; F2 
and F4 = -.19; F3 and F4 = -.29. TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20, BVAQ = 
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale, PERS = Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale. 
Confirmatory factor analyses 
Of the theoretically informed CFA models, Model 1 based on the attention-appraisal 
model appeared to be the best fit to the data (for fit index values, factor loadings, and 
estimated factor intercorrelations for each model, see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, respectively). In 
Model 1, the latent ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’ and ‘EOT’ factors all loaded strongly (factor loadings = 
.727-.853) on the higher-order ‘alexithymia’ factor, indicating that these three first-order 
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factors could be components of a common higher-order construct. Models based on the 
Toronto model exhibited poorer levels of fit. The main source of misspecification appeared to 
be the latent ‘DFAN’ factor. In Model 2a, the ‘DFAN’ factor loaded poorly and non-
significantly (factor loading = -.102) on the higher-order ‘alexithymia’ factor, and in Model 
2b, the ‘EOT’ factor loaded poorly (factor loading = .256) with the ‘DFAN’ factor on the 
higher-order ‘operative thinking’ factor. Thus, the ‘DFAN’ factor did not appear to be part of 
the same latent structure as ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’ or ‘EOT’. Model 3, based on the Amsterdam 
model, similarly exhibited poorer levels of fit. The higher-order ‘affective alexithymia’ factor 
(representing difficulties fantasising and low negative reactivity) in this model was strongly 
negatively correlated with the higher-order ‘cognitive alexithymia’ factor (estimated r = -
.527); thus, these two higher-order factors were not orthogonal or positively correlated. 
Indeed, an inspection of the factor intercorrelations within the correlated baseline model 
(Model 4) revealed that the ‘negative reactivity’ factor was significantly positively associated 
with ‘DIF’, ‘DDF’ and ‘EOT’, and generally correlated more so with these cognitive 
alexithymia components than it did with ‘DFAN’. In other words, across our CFAs, cognitive 
alexithymia was associated with higher levels of negative reactivity, not less. 
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Table 5.3 
Goodness-of-Fit Index Values for the Examined CFA Models 
Model χ2 (df) p CFI NFI RMSEA (90% CI) AIC 
Attention-appraisal model 
   Model 1 445.196 (85) .000 .896 .875 .107 (.098-.117) 515.196 
   Model 1 (correlated error) 307.819 (79) .000 .934 .914 .089 (.079-.099) 389.819 
Toronto model 
   Model 2a 458.382 (85) .000 .892 .872 .109 (.100-.119) 528.382 
   Model 2a (correlated error) 330.777 (79) .000 .927 .907 .093 (.083-.104) 412.777 
   Model 2b 579.531 (85) .000 .857 .838 .126 (.116-.136) 649.531 
   Model 2b (correlated error) 448.075 (79) .000 .894 .875 .113 (.098-123) 530.075 
Amsterdam model 
   Model 3 476.085 (86) .000 .887 .867 .111 (.102-.121) 544.085 
   Model 3 (correlated error) 310.652 (80) .000 .933 .913 .089 (.078-.099) 390.652 
Baseline correlated model 
   Model 4 357.153 (80) .000 .920 .900 .097 (.087-.108) 437.153 
   Model 4 (correlated error) 227.055 (74) .000 .956 .936 .075 (.064-.086) 319.055 
Note. Models labelled with ‘correlated error’ included minor model modifications whereby some 
indicator error terms were allowed to correlate. These modifications were added because modification 
indices indicated that, across all the examined models, some error terms were substantially correlated; 
these error terms were between those indicators/subscales that came from the same measure (e.g., the 
TAS-20) and thus appeared to represent some common method variance. On these grounds, we 
considered these modifications to be theoretically justifiable (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The error terms of 
the following indicators were allowed to correlate: T-DIF and T-DDF; D-VERBALISING parcel 1 and 
D-VERBALISING parcel 2; D-VERBALISING parcel 2 and D-ANALYSING; D-ANALYSING and D-
FANTASISING parcel 1; D-ANALYSING and D-FANTASISING parcel 3; D-FANTASISING parcel 2 
and D-FANTASISING parcel 3. CFI = comparative fit index, NFI = normed fit index, RMSEA = root 
mean square error of approximation, AIC = Akaike information criterion, CI = confidence interval. 
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Table 5.4 
Standardised Factor Loadings for the Indicators and Latent Factors in CFA Models Based on the 




Toronto model Amsterdam model 
Observed variables and latent 
factors Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 




‘DIF’ factor .853b .953b .919b .861b 
T-DIF .767 .774 .788 .771 
D-Identifying .815 .823 .777 .816 
Clarity .862 .862 .860 .867 




‘DDF’ factor .823b .734b .774b .831b 
T-DDF .876 .871 .899 .881 
D-Verbalising parcel 1 .855 .855 .855 .855 
D-Verbalising parcel 2 .856 .850 .847 .854 




‘EOT’ factor .727b .659b .256b .720b 
T-EOT .751 .750 .741 .752 
D-Analysing .846 .847 .877 .846 





‘DFAN’ factor - -.102*b .860b .545b 
D-Fantasising parcel 1 .594 .587 .596 .708 
D-Fantasising parcel 2 .857 .846 .852 .848 
D-Fantasising parcel 3 .778 .793 .782 .802 
- - - Affective 
alexithymiaa 
‘Negative reactivity’ factor - - - -.802b 
   Negative-activation .870 .874 .870 .875 
   Negative-intensity .885 .881 .884 .895 
   Negative-duration .892 .892 .883 .896 
Note. *p > .05. aLabel of higher-order factor. bFactor loading of first-order factor on higher-order factor. 
Factor loadings <.40 are in boldface.
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Table 5.5 
Estimated Factor Intercorrelations for CFA Models Based on the Attention-Appraisal 
Model, Toronto Model, and Amsterdam Model 
Factor 
Model/factor F1 F2 F3 F4 
Attention-appraisal model 
    Model 1 
      F1 ‘alexithymia’ - - - - 
      F2 ‘DFAN’ -.029 - - - 
      F3 ‘negative reactivity’ .449*** -.251*** - - 
Toronto model 
    Model 2a 
      F1 ‘alexithymia’ - - - - 
      F2 ‘negative reactivity’ .513*** - - - 
    Model 2b 
      F1 ‘affect awareness’ - - - - 
      F2 ‘operative thinking’ -.052 - - - 
      F3 ‘negative reactivity’ .551*** -.261*** - - 
Amsterdam model 
    Model 3 
      F1 ‘cognitive alexithymia’ - - - - 
      F2 ‘affective alexithymia’ -.527*** - - - 
Baseline correlated model 
    Model 4 
      F1 ‘DIF’ - - - - 
      F2 ‘DDF’ .667*** - - - 
      F3 ‘EOT’ .609*** .648*** - - 
      F4 ‘DFAN’ -.146* -.045 .216** - 
      F5 ‘negative reactivity’ .558*** .290* .141* .253*** 
Note. p < .001***, p < .01**, p < .05*. 
Discussion 
One purpose of this study was to explore the latent structure of alexithymia. In our 
sample, we found that DIF, DDF and EOT formed a coherent latent structure, DFAN and 
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DEMO were not part of this same latent structure, and alexithymia was associated with 
higher (not lower) levels of negative reactivity. Our results were, therefore, consistent 
with the view that the alexithymia construct is comprised of only three components; DIF, 
DDF and EOT. 
This pattern of findings has now emerged across multiple samples and assessment 
modalities (e.g., Bausch et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 1985; Vorst & Bermond, 2001; Watters, 
Taylor, & Bagby, 2016; Watters, Taylor, Quilty, & Bagby, 2016), and as such, we think the 
current body of evidence is, on balance, sufficient to warrant a refinement to the definition of 
alexithymia; refined to a construct comprised of only DIF, DDF and EOT. This pattern of 
findings is consistent with the structure specified by our attention-appraisal model of 
alexithymia, rather than that of the Toronto or Amsterdam models. Consequently, by aligning 
alexithymia theory with recent advances in the broader emotion regulation field (Gross, 
2015a), we think our model might provide a useful framework for understanding and defining 
the alexithymia phenomenon in future work. When the alexithymia phenomenon is viewed 
through the lens of our model, this accounts for a number of unresolved issues within the 
field. 
Firstly, by conceptualising alexithymia as a set of difficulties during the emotion 
valuation process (Gross, 2015a) and linking these difficulties to emotion schemas (Lane & 
Schwartz, 1987), our model can account for why most empirical work finds DFAN to not be 
part of the alexithymia construct; because unlike DIF, DDF and EOT, the extent to which one 
engages in daydreaming and fantasy would not seem to be dependent on the developmental 
level of one’s emotion schemas (see also, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden, & 
D'Argembeau, 2012). 
Secondly, by positioning alexithymia within Gross’s (2015a) extended process model 
of emotion regulation, our model can account for why empirical work commonly finds 
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alexithymia to be associated with high levels of negative reactivity. Namely, if one accepts 
that people are generally driven by hedonistic motivations to feel pleasure and avoid pain, 
then most emotion regulation attempts will be focused on up-regulating positive feelings and 
down-regulating negative feelings (Gross, 2014). Consequently, people who have poor 
emotion regulation skills would be expected to experience negative feelings more intensely 
and positive feelings less intensely than people who are adept at emotion regulation. In turn, 
because alexithymia constitutes difficulties during the emotion valuation process that is 
responsible for activating regulatory attempts, alexithymic people would be expected to have 
poorer emotion regulation skills and less capacity to control their negative feelings. Indeed, 
alexithymia has been consistently associated with maladaptive emotion regulation attempts 
(e.g., Swart, Kortekaas, & Aleman, 2009) and elsewhere has been described as a rate-limiting 
factor for successful emotion regulation (Gross, 2014). In other words, from this perspective, 
it is not the absence of affect that characterises alexithymia, but rather, the undifferentiated 
structure of the affect. This also accounts for why high levels of alexithymia are commonly 
observed in patients with psychopathologies characterised by emotion dysregulation and 
negative reactivity (New et al., 2012; Leweke, Leichsenring, Kruse, & Hermes, 2012). 
Thirdly, by making a distinction between ability deficit alexithymia and avoidance 
alexithymia, our model informs the debate within the literature with respect to whether 
alexithymia should be considered a deficit (e.g., Taylor et al., 1999) or a defence (e.g., 
Marchesi, Ossola, Tonna, & De Panfilis, 2014). Within our model, alexithymia is both, and it 
is the combination of ability deficits and avoidant defences that determines one’s overall 
level of alexithymia. Similarly, this conceptualisation informs a related debate on whether 
alexithymia should be considered a stable trait (e.g., Taylor et al., 1999) or a state reaction to 
distress (e.g., Marchesi et al., 2014). Within our model, one’s level of ability deficit 
alexithymia should be relatively stable, but levels of avoidance alexithymia may increase as a 
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regulatory response to unpleasant feelings. This is consistent with the current set of findings 
from longitudinal studies, which report that alexithymia levels (TAS-20 total scale scores) 
usually elevate during periods of distress, but nonetheless exhibit an underlying level of 
relative stability (de Timary, Luts, Hers, & Luminet, 2008; Luminet et al., 2001; Luminet et 
al., 2007). 
Fourthly, our model could be helpful in informing the treatment of those psychiatric 
patients who present with high levels of alexithymia. Our model suggests that psychotherapy 
with such patients should include a focus on developing their emotion schemas and reducing 
their use of experiential avoidance as an emotion regulation strategy. From this perspective, 
difficulties attending to and appraising emotions should be targeted by guiding the patient in 
focusing on the most pertinent features of an emotional response, and guiding them in 
mentally representing, labelling, and linking the visceral sensations, behavioural tendencies, 
and eliciting events surrounding this affect. The goal is to facilitate the patient’s progression 
to a higher level of emotional awareness at the attention and appraisal stages of emotion 
valuation (Gross, 2015a; Lane & Schwartz, 1987). Psychotherapy techniques compatible with 
this approach have been described previously by several authors, including Kennedy and 
Franklin (2002), Lane et al. (2015), Taylor et al. (1999), and Neumann, Malec and Hammond 
(2017), and we consider mindfulness techniques (e.g., mindfulness of emotions; Harris, 2009) 
to be of particular relevance. Research on the treatment of alexithymia in the context of 
psychopathology is still in its relative infancy (Samur et al., 2013), and the attention-appraisal 
model could provide a useful framework for the design of alexithymia focused psychotherapy 
programs to be tested in future work. 
Fifthly, the TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994) has been by far the most widely used 
measure of alexithymia since its development (Taylor et al., 2016), and because the TAS-20 
includes only DIF, DDF and EOT items, most of the alexithymia literature has already 
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operationalised the construct in a manner consistent with the three component definition we 
have suggested in this paper (e.g., Bankier, Aigner, & Bach, 2001; Leweke et al., 2012; 
Panayiotou et al., 2015; Parker et al., 2008; Subic-Wrana, Bruder, Thomas, Lane, & Köhle, 
2005; for a review, see Taylor & Bagby, 2004). The introduction of our model, therefore, 
reduces the discrepancy that some authors had noted to exist between alexithymia theory and 
alexithymia measurement (Sifneos, 1996; Bagby, Taylor, Quilty, & Parker, 2007). 
Limitations 
Whilst we consider our paper to make a strong contribution, some limitations of our 
factor analytic study should be noted. Although we used multiple measures of alexithymia, 
we used only one measure of DFAN and all our measures were self-report questionnaires. 
Previous research has shown that the BVAQ DFAN subscale correlates strongly with 
observer-rated measures of DFAN (e.g., Rosenberg et al., 2016), but nonetheless, it would be 
ideal for future research of this type to also include observer-rated measures like the TSIA. 
Our results also only relate to an Australian adult community sample. Similar results to ours 
have emerged when these measures have been examined in isolation across various 
populations (e.g., Meganck et al., 2008; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003; Bermond et al., 
2007), but more research is needed in which multiple measures are administered together. 
Additionally, whilst our model includes hypotheses about the role of emotion schemas and 
experiential avoidance in alexithymia, we did not test these mechanisms in this study. As 
such, from our data, we can only comment on the latent structure of the construct rather than 
the mechanisms underlying this structure. There is a growing body of work supporting the 
role of emotion schemas (e.g., Lane et al., 1996; Luminet et al., 2006; Lundh et al., 2002; 
Suslow & Junghanns, 2002; Vermeulen et al., 2006) and experiential avoidance (e.g., Bilotta 
et al., 2015; Coriale et al., 2012; Panayiotou et al., 2015) in alexithymia, but more research of 
this type is needed to enhance understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of the construct. 
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Nonetheless, despite these limitations, in terms of the latent structure of the construct, 
we think the current body of empirical evidence is sufficient to warrant a refinement to 
the definition of alexithymia; refined to a construct comprised of DIF, DDF and EOT. 
Conclusions 
The latent structure of the alexithymia construct, statistically, appears to be comprised 
of only DIF, DDF and EOT. We, therefore, recommend that the definition of alexithymia be 
refined so as to be consistent with the weight of the empirical literature, and include only 
these three components. This structure is consistent with the specifications of the attention-
appraisal model of alexithymia, and by aligning alexithymia theory with recent advances in 
the broader emotion regulation field (Gross, 2015a), we think that this model provides a 
useful framework for clinicians and researchers to use and test in future work. 
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Table 1C 




Note. p < .001**, p < .05*. TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20, BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire, DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale, PERS = Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale. 
 
 
 TAS-20  BVAQ  DERS 














composite Clarity Awareness 
  TAS-20                 
    Total scale - .84** .85** .70**  .79** -.06 .65** -.08 .70** .00 .56**  .72** .72** .55** 
    T-DIF .84** - .58** .31**  .54** -.22** .38** -.18** .65** -.16* .30**  .53** .64** .30** 
    T-DDF .85** .58** - .45**  .76** -.07 .77** -.13* .56** .04 .44**  .62** .63** .46** 
    T-EOT .70** .31** .45** -  .62** .22** .43** .18* .45** .16* .65**  .59** .40** .59** 
  BVAQ                 
    Cognitive alexithymia .79** .54** .76** .62**  - .17* .84** .06 .76** .23** .80**  .78** .66** .69** 
    Affective alexithymia -.06 -.22** -.07 .22**  .17* - .06 .81** -.01 .72** .39**  .08 -.15* .22** 
    D-Verbalising .65** .38** .77** .43**  .84** .06 - -.03 .42** .14* .48**  .57** .48** .50** 
    D-Fantasising -.08 -.18** -.13* .18**  .06 .81** -.03 - -.02 .19** .21**  -.02 -.15* .09 
    D-Identifying .70** .65** .56** .45**  .76** -.01 .42** -.02 - .00 .47**  .66** .71** .47** 
    D-Emotionalising -.00 -.16* .04 .16*  .23** .72** .14* .19** .00 - .41**  .15* -.07 .28** 
    D-Analysing .56** .30** .44** .65**  .80** .39** .48** .21** .47** .41** -  .66** .41** .69** 
  DERS                 
    Alexithymia composite .72** .53** .62** .59**  .78** .08 .57** -.02 .66** .15* .66**  - .81** .91** 
    Clarity .72** .66** .63** .40**  .66** -.15* .48** -.15* .71** -.07 .41**  .81** - .48** 
    Awareness .55** .30** .46** .59**  .69** .22** .50** .09 .47** .28** .69**  .91** .48** - 
  PERS                 
    General positive reactivity -.29** -.23** -.26** -.20**  -.36** -.19** -.30** -.03 -.31** -.28** -.26**  -.35** -.29** -.31** 
    Positive-activation -.25** -.19** -.24** -.15*  -.33** -.18* -.30** -.05 -.28** -.24** -.21**  -.30** -.24** -.26** 
    Positive-intensity -.08 .01 -.09 -.13*  -.16** -.26** -.17* -.10 -.04 -.33** -.17*  -.17* -.07 -.21** 
    Positive-duration -.40** -.38** -.32** -.23**  -.41** -.07 -.29** .06 -.43** -.18** -.28**  -.42** -.40** -.34** 
    General negative reactivity .43** .53** .31** .14*  .29** -.34** .22** -.25** .38** -.28** .12*  .27** .43** .09 
    Negative-activation .44** .52** .30** .19**  .31** -.28** .21** -.18* .39** -.27** .16*  .30** .42** .14* 
    Negative-intensity .32** .45** .24** .00  .19** -.36** .15* -.28** .29** -.27** .02  .15* .32** -.01 
    Negative-duration .43** .50** .31** .18*  .31** -.32** .24** -.24** .38** -.25** .14*  .30** .45** .13* 
